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1Chapter
Machine Learning Applications in 
Misuse and Anomaly Detection
Jaydip Sen and Sidra Mehtab
Abstract
Machine learning and data mining algorithms play important roles in design-
ing intrusion detection systems. Based on their approaches toward the detection 
of attacks in a network, intrusion detection systems can be broadly categorized 
into two types. In the misuse detection systems, an attack in a system is detected 
whenever the sequence of activities in the network matches with a known attack 
signature. In the anomaly detection approach, on the other hand, anomalous states 
in a system are identified based on a significant difference in the state transitions of 
the system from its normal states. This chapter presents a comprehensive discussion 
on some of the existing schemes of intrusion detection based on misuse detection, 
anomaly detection and hybrid detection approaches. Some future directions of 
research in the design of algorithms for intrusion detection are also identified.
Keywords: misuse detection, signature detection, anomaly detection,  
hybrid detection, clustering, classification, unsupervised learning, supervised 
learning, intrusion detection system, network security
1. Introduction
Cyberinfrastructures are vulnerable to various possible attacks due to the flaws 
in their design and implementation. The major flaws that cause most of the critical 
vulnerabilities are errors in system programs and faulty design of the software. 
Malicious attackers can exploit these system vulnerabilities by following a sequence 
of activities, either from inside or from outside of the infrastructure, and cause 
significant damage. These events manifest themselves in the form of different 
distinct characteristics that are defined as patterns of attacks. Misuse or signature 
detection techniques attempt to proactively detect the presence of such patterns so 
that any malicious attack on the infrastructure can be effectively defended against. 
It is possible to defend against all known vulnerabilities in cyberinfrastructures by 
using supervised learning approaches for misuse and signature detection. The most 
convenient method of signature detection is measuring the similarity between the 
patterns recognized in the current network activity and the already known patterns 
of various types of cyber-attacks. However, execution signatures may vary substan-
tially from one attack category to another, so that specific detection methods are 
required to classify attack patterns and, thus, to improve detection capability.
Anomaly detection systems, however, work in a different way. The objective 
of these systems is to proactively detect any activity or event in a network or host 
computer that exhibits aberration from the normal behavior of the network or 
the host. The normal behavior is described by a predefined set of activities. The 
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working principle of an anomaly detection system is fundamentally different from 
that of misuse or signature detection system. Misuse or signature detection systems 
first need to be equipped with a well-defined set of attack signatures populated in 
their database. An anomaly detection system, on the other hand, defines a detailed 
and accurate profile of the normal behavior of the networks and hosts. The normal 
state of the cyberinfrastructure, consisting of networks and hosts, indicates an 
attack-free state. When an anomalous activity occurs in the cyberinfrastructure, the 
anomaly detection system notices a state change from the normal state to a state that 
is no longer normal. On observing this state change, the anomaly detection system 
raises an alert of a possible attack on the cyberinfrastructure. Unlike the signature 
or misuse detection systems, the anomaly detection systems are capable of detect-
ing novel attacks as the detection strategy for these systems is based on the state 
change information, rather than a matching of attack signatures. It is precisely for 
this reason that anomaly detection schemes are capable of detecting various differ-
ent types of attacks. Some of these attacks include: (i) segmentation of binary code 
in a user password, (ii) backdoor service on a malicious process on a well-known 
port number in a computing host, (iii) stealthy reconnaissance attempts, (iv) novel 
buffer overflow attacks, (v) direction of hypertext transmission protocol (HTTP) 
on a nonstandard port number, (vi) stealthy attacks on protocol stacks and (vii) dif-
ferent variants of denial of service (DoS) and distributed denial of service (DDoS), 
and so on. Early and accurate detection of these attacks poses significant challenges 
in the design of a robust and accurate anomaly detection system.
In this chapter, we have briefly reviewed some of the well-known misuse and 
anomaly-based detection systems that are proposed in the literature. We have 
also discussed some hybrid approaches in intrusion detections that effectively 
combine misuse and anomaly detection approaches so as to improve the detection 
accuracy and reduce false alarms. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents a brief discussion on misuse or signature-based detection 
approach. In Section 3, we discuss how various machine learning approaches can 
be applied in misuse or signature-based systems. Section 4 provides a brief over-
view of anomaly detection, while in Section 5, we discuss how machine learning 
and data mining algorithms can be effectively deployed in anomaly-based detec-
tion systems. In Section 6, we briefly discuss the working principles of some of 
the well-known hybrid detection systems. Section 7 concludes the chapter while 
highlighting some of the recent trends in machine learning approaches in network 
security applications.
2. Misuse or signature detection
Misuse detection, also called signature detection, is an approach in which 
attack patterns or unauthorized and suspicious behaviors are learned based on past 
activities and then the knowledge about the learned patterns is used to detect or 
predict subsequent similar such patterns in a network. The attack or misuse pat-
terns, which are also called signatures, include patterns of log files or data packets 
that were found to be malicious and identified as threats to the network and the 
computing hosts. Each log file consists of its own signature that exhibits a unique 
pattern consisting of binary bits 0 and 1. For intrusion detection systems protect-
ing host computers, that is, for host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDSs), 
the attack signature databases may contain various patterns of system calls that 
represent a different attack on the host. In the case of a network-based intrusion 
detection system (NIDS), attack signatures reveal specific patterns in data packets. 
These patterns may include signatures of the data payload, the packet header, 
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unauthorized activities, such as improper file transfer protocol (FTP) initiation, or 
failed login attempt in Telnet. A typical data packet includes several fields such as: 
(i) the source Internet protocol (IP) address, (ii) the destination IP address, (iii) 
the source port number for transmission control protocol (TCP) or user datagram 
protocol (UDP), (iv) the destination port number for TCP or UDP, (v) the protocol 
description such as UDP, TCP or Internet control message protocol (ICMP), and 
(vi) the data payload. An attack signature can be detected in any specific field, or in 
any combination of these fields.
Figure 1 shows how a typical misuse or signature detection system works. These 
detection systems execute algorithms that attempt to match learned patterns or 
signatures from past attacks with the current activities in a network in order to 
detect any possible attack or malicious activities. If the signature of any current 
activity in the network matches with the signature of any activity in the attack 
signature database, the detection system raises an alert. A module in the detection 
system initiates a further investigation of the attack and starts invoking appropri-
ate security modules to defend against such attacks. If the attack is found to be a 
real attack and not a false alarm by the detection system, the existing database of 
the attack signatures is updated with the signature of the new attack. For example, 
if the signature of an attack is: login name = “Sidra,” then, whenever there is any 
attempt to login into any device in the network with the name “Sidra,” the signature 
detection system will raise an alert of an attack.
This approach adopted in a signature-based detection system is primarily 
meant for detecting already known threats and vulnerabilities in a network. 
However, these systems suffer from a drawback of producing too many false 
alarms. A false alarm or a false positive refers to a situation where the system raises 
an alert of an attack while no attack has really happened on the network. As an 
example, let us consider the case where a user logs into a remote server. If the user 
forgets the login password and makes multiple attempts of login, the account of 
the user is most likely to be locked after a certain number of such failed attempts. 
As the signature-based detection system cannot differentiate between a failed 
login attempt by a legitimate user, and a malicious user attempting to login in 
an unauthorized way into some legitimate user’s account, both the activities are 
considered as attacks.
Figure 1. 
Working of misuse or signature detection: Illustration of “if-else” rules.
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The efficacy of misuse or signature detection system largely depends on the 
completeness and sufficiency of the knowledge of attack patterns and signatures 
captured in the attack signature database of the system. It is a nontrivial task to 
capture and represent the knowledge of attacks and system vulnerabilities in a 
cyberinfrastructure or in a network of computing machines, and the job heavily 
depends on domain experts. Since the knowledge and skills of domain experts may 
vary significantly from person to person, the design of signature detection systems, 
quite often, can be incomplete and inaccurate. Moreover, a slight variation, evolu-
tion, blending, or a combination of already known attacks can make signature 
detection an impossible task. This is a typical problem with any similarity-based 
learning system like a signature-based intrusion detection system.
3. Machine learning in misuse or signature detection
Figure 2 depicts the working mechanism of misuse or signature detection 
consists of five major steps: (i) data collection, (ii) data preprocessing, (iii) misuse 
or signature identification using a matching algorithm, (iv) rules regeneration and 
(v) denial of service (DoS) or other security response strategy. In most of the cases, 
the data sources are: network and host audit logs, packets transmitting over the 
network, and windows registry. Data preprocessing is a critical step that prepares 
the raw data for learning patterns. These steps involve the reduction of noise by 
eliminating outliers, normalizing or standardizing of data, and finally selecting and 
extracting features. After the data preprocessing step is over, an automatic intel-
ligent learning system is deployed to build a learning model and extract rules using 
prior knowledge of the execution of malicious programs, network traffic data, and 
vulnerabilities in network infrastructure. The model is now ready for signature 
and misuse detection. The learned classification model is applied to the incoming 
network traffic for signature detection. If any part of the network traffic is found 
to be similar to attack patterns learned by the model, then an alarm is raised and 
the traffic is further analyzed for identifying whether it is really an attack or a false 
alarm. Consequently, misuse or signature detection can be simply understood as an 
“if-then” sequence as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 2. 
Sequence of execution of misuse or signature detection modules.
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We present a variety of misuse detection techniques that are based on machine 
learning methods. In the following, we discuss some examples of machine learning 
methods applied in misuse detection systems.
3.1 Classification using association rules
Agrawal et al. proposed an elegant approach to discover underlying association 
rules to identify and then establish causal relationships among attributes that may 
exist in a multidimensional database [1]. Association rules mining identifies the 
frequent existing patterns in a dataset. This may help, for example, in designing 
algorithms for a computer antivirus software. A computer antivirus attempts to 
identify viruses that exhibit some frequently occurring patterns in a transaction 
dataset. The use of association rules mining and frequently occurring episodes 
from the computer audit data and exploiting those rules in feature selection had 
also been described in the literature [2]. Fuzzy association rules were designed for 
misuse and signature detection on 1998 DARPA intrusion detection dataset [3]. For 
the purpose of feature selection, 41 features were extracted for each connection 
record that included 24 different attack types. The attack traffic in the network 
was essentially of four types: (i) denial of service (DoS), (ii) remote to user (R2L), 
(iii) user to root and (iv) probes. Including the normal traffic in the network, the 
association rule mining algorithms extracted the essential features of five types of 
network data—four categories of attack traffic and one type of normal traffic.
3.2 Artificial neural networks
In a connectionist approach, ANNs carry out the task of pattern recognition 
and pattern matching using very complex nonlinear transformation functions and 
the use of multiple hyperplanes separating data of one class from the other. The 
dynamic nature of the network traffic and the ever-changing characteristics of 
various attacks on the networks require a very flexible and adaptive misuse detec-
tion system that can efficiently and effectively identify a variety of intrusions. 
Application of ANNs in designing a misuse detection system incorporates the ability 
to analyze data even if the data may be noisy, distorted, and incomplete. Since ANNs 
have the ability of learning very accurately from training data, these models can 
very effectively detect misuse attacks and identify suspicious events in a network. 
However, this hypothesis is based on the assumption that attackers usually deploy 
the same approach of an attack on multiple networks, and ANNs can effectively 
detect similar attacks that had been used by the attackers in the past. Use of ANNs 
for misuse and signature-based intrusion detection is discussed in [4]. The intru-
sion detection system (IDS) presented by the author exploits the ability of ANN in 
classifying nonlinearly separable data into various classes even if the data sources are 
noisy and limited. The ANN, which is also called a feed-forward multi-layer percep-
tron (MLP), is equipped with four fully connected layers of nodes with nine nodes 
in the input layer, two nodes in the output layer, and two hidden layers between the 
input and the output layers. The two nodes in the output layer are used to indicate 
the classification results of the network traffic—the normal traffic data being classi-
fied with a label of 1, and the attack traffic with a label of 0. Nine important features 
were extracted by the ANN from the network event data. The network event data 
are gathered from the data packets transmitted over the network. The nine features 
of network data traffic that are extracted by the ANN are: (i) protocol, (ii) source 
port number, (iii) destination port, (iv) source internet protocol (IP) address, (v) 
destination IP address, (vi) internet control message protocol (ICMP) type, (vii) 
ICMP code, (viii) data payload length, and (ix) data payload content. Each record 
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of network traffic data was first preprocessed, its features were extracted, and then 
the features having categorical values were transformed into some standardized 
numeric values. Around 10,000 network traffic records were synthetically gener-
ated for the training and the testing of the ANN model, and approximately 3000 
among those records were detected to be anomalous.
3.3 Support vector machines
Because of its intrinsic characteristics, support vector machines (SVMs) are 
capable of minimizing the structural risk of a dataset by reducing its classifica-
tion error on unseen records, unlike ANNs which focus more on minimization 
of empirical risk of the dataset. In order to achieve its goal, a model based on the 
SVM approach determines its number of parameters based on the margin that 
separates the data points. This margin is determined by the number of support 
vectors present in the dataset. The support vectors are those data points that lie 
nearest to the hyperplane but belong to different classes. In contrast to an ANN, the 
number of parameters in an SVM model does not depend on the number of feature 
dimensions in the dataset. This unique property of an SVM makes it so powerful in 
many practical machine learning applications. In the context of intrusion detection 
applications, SVMs present two distinct advantages over their ANN counterparts. 
SVM models execute much faster and they are more scalable. High speed in execu-
tion is crucial for detecting attacks in real-time, while scalability is a mandatory 
requirement for deployment in a complex cyberinfrastructure. Moreover, SVM 
models can be made to adapt fast based on changes introduced in the training 
dataset. This feature of SVM is critical when the patterns in the attack traffic change 
very rapidly. Mukkamala et al. demonstrated how SVM models can be deployed for 
the purpose of detection of an attack and misuse patterns in context to computer 
security breaches [5]. The security breaches considered by the authors were bugs in 
system software bugs, hardware or software failures, incorrect system administra-
tion procedures, or failure of the system authentication. For the purpose of building 
the SVM model, the authors used a training set of 699 data points that contained 
some records representing actual attack traffic, some records that represented 
probable attacks, and remaining records exhibiting normal traffic patterns. Eight 
features were extracted after the initial cleaning and preprocessing phase of the 
data. Finally, all feature values for each record were normalized to [0, 1]. The test 
dataset consisted of 250 data points and 8 features. In the confusion matrix yielded 
by the classification model produced a precision value of 85.53% on the training 
dataset, and the corresponding value for the test dataset was 94%. This experiment 
clearly demonstrated the fact that SVM is, in general, more efficient and accurate 
in identifying misuse and signature-based attack traffic than its ANN counterpart. 
It also validated the hypothesis that an SVM can effectively simulate security 
scenarios using its component to adapt to a given information system. Once adapted 
to a given system, an SVM model can carry out real-time detection of attack traffic, 
and minimize false alarms while yielding a very high true detection rate.
3.4 Decision tree and classification and regression tree
Decision tree is a nonparametric machine learning method of model building 
that does not impose any preconditions or requirements on the data. A typical deci-
sion tree uses a classification algorithm that labels a data point based on the feature 
values in the data record corresponding to that node in the decision tree. In order to 
arrive at a classification decision corresponding to a leaf node in a decision tree, one 
has to trace the path from the root node to the leaf node. The trace of the path from 
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the root node to a given leaf node can then be converted to a classification rule. If 
designed optimally, decision trees can yield high classification accuracy, while they 
involve less complexity in implementation, and have the ability to model intuitive 
knowledge stored in a high-dimensional dataset. It is precisely these characteristics 
that make decision trees a very popular choice in many real-world applications. 
Among the decision tree algorithms, CART represents trees in a form of binary 
recursive partitioning. It classifies objects or predicts outcomes by selecting from 
a large number of variables. The most important of these variables determine the 
outcome variable. Kruegel and Toth proposed a signature and misuse detection 
system following a decision tree-based approach [6]. In the scheme proposed by the 
authors, the original rules were partitioned into a smaller subset of rules in such a 
way that the analysis of a single subset is enough for each input element in the signa-
ture detection system [6]. The decision tree algorithm was utilized for detecting the 
feature that most effectively discriminated against the rule sets of different classes. 
The algorithm is executed in parallel for evaluating each feature on all the rules in a 
subset. In the decision tree, the root node corresponded to the universal set of rules. 
In other words, the root node contained all the rules. The children nodes represented 
the direct subsets of rules that were partitioned from the rule set based on the first 
feature in the dataset. The splitting of the nodes in the tree continued till a stage was 
reached where each node was found to contain one rule only. Labeling was done on 
each node using the feature that was used for splitting the node. Each directed edge 
emanating from a node and impinging on its child was marked with the value of the 
feature specified in the child node. Each leaf node contained either one rule or a set 
of rules that were not distinguishable by the features in the dataset. During splitting, 
the sequence of features encountered had an impact on the shape and depth of the 
tree structure. The authors had also proposed an algorithm that generated a decision 
tree for detecting malicious events using a limited number of comparisons on the set 
of rules extracted. Chebrolu et al. used KDD cup 1999 intrusion detection dataset 
to build a classification and regression tree (CART) [7]. The dataset included 5092 
cases and 41 variables. There were 208,772 possible splits in the CART algorithm. 
Gini index was used for determining the optimal splitting at the nodes.
3.5 Bayesian network classifier
The major shortcoming of most of the rule-based approaches to classification is 
that these methods treat each event in isolation and never consider the entire gamut of 
events together taking into account their contextual and temporal relationships. A rule 
is derived based on the signature of a packet. The signature of a packet is determined 
using a set of protocols. Many a time, the signature exhibited by a subset of packets 
belonging to the activities of a malicious user may match that of a normal user; rule-
based misuse detection systems often suffer from high rates of false alarm. In the case 
of a false alarm, the intrusion detection system erroneously identifies an activity in a 
network as malicious while the activity is actually perfectly normal. Bayesian network 
(BN)-based models get rid of this problem of rule-based detection systems. Using 
Bayesian statistics, BN represents problems in networks by specifying the causal rela-
tionships between subsets of variables. Typically, a BN is presented as a directed graph 
that does not contain any cycle. Hence, a BN is also referred to as a DAG-directed 
acyclic graph. Each node in a BN represents a random variable. A random variable 
is a variable that can assume a set of values; each value has a specified probability of 
occurrence. Each arc in a BN depicts a causal relationship with the dependence of 
the child node on the parent node being expressed as a conditional probability value. 
The head node and the tail node of an arc are referred to as the parent node and the 
child node respectively. For example, if in a BN, there is an arc X1 X4, then X1 is the 
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predecessor of node X4, and X4 is the descendent of node X1. In the example BN, 
 the node X1 has no predecessor. However, it has three descendant nodes: X2, X3, and 
X4. Along with BN, the conditional probability table (CPT) presents the dependencies 
on the net for each variable/node. For each variable/node, the conditional probability 
P(variable | parent (variable)) is given in CPT for each possible combination of its 
parents [8–10]. Chebrolu et al. investigated the performance of a feature selection and 
classification algorithm using BN [7]. Markov blanket method was used to find the 
most significant feature set in a training dataset that included five classes of network 
traffic: normal, probe, DOS, U2R, and R2L.
3.6 Naïve Bayes
The naïve Bayes classifier makes the assumption of class conditional indepen-
dence. Given a data sample, its features are assumed to be conditionally indepen-
dent of each other. This is in contrast with a BN that assumes dependencies among 
the features. Schultz et al. used the naïve Bayes approach to detect new, previously 
unseen malicious executables accurately and automatically [11].
Most of the machine learning methods for misuse and signature detection are 
in the initial stages of research and are yet to find any commercial deployment. 
Moreover, feature selection before traffic classification is a challenging task. 
Detection quality heavily depends on the experience and knowledge of the security 
experts dealing with the problem. It also depends on an exhaustive testing and 
refining process. The use of decision trees for the selection of a significant feature 
subset has only partially solved this problem. Table 1 summarizes the signature-
based detection schemes we discussed in this section. We have categorized the 
schemes based on their approach, input data used, and level of detection.
4. Anomaly detection
When a novel attack is launched on a network, misuse detection systems cannot 
detect the attack as the attack signature is not present in the existing database of 
attack signatures. However, an anomaly detection system has the ability to detect 
new and unseen attacks and raise an early alarm before any substantial damage 
to the network could be done by the attack. Like the misuse detection approach, 
Detection mechanism Input data format Detection 
level
References
Rule-based signature detection Frequency of system calls, offline Host [2]
Fuzzy association rules Frequency of system calls, online Host [3]
Artificial neural networks TCP/IP packets, offline Host [4, 12]
Support vector machines TCP/IP packets, offline Network [5]
Linear genetic programs TCP/IP packets, offline Network [3]
Decision tree TCP/IP packets, online Network [6]
Classification and regression 
trees
Frequency of system calls, offline Host [7]
Statistical method Executables, offline Host [11]
Bayesian networks Frequency of system calls, offline Host [7]
Table 1. 
Misuse or signature-based detection schemes.
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anomaly detection relies on determining a clear boundary between the normal 
and the anomalous traffic. The profile of the normal behavior is assumed to be 
significantly different from that of the anomalous behavior. The profile of the 
normal events and the normal traffic should preferably satisfy a set of criteria in 
the sense that it must contain a very clearly defined normal behavior. For example, 
the normal behavior specification must include the IP address or the hostname of 
a computing machine, or it should include a virtual local area network’s (VLAN) 
details to which it belongs and have the ability to track the normal behavior of the 
target environment sensitively. In addition, the normal profile should include the 
following details: (i) occurrence patterns of some specific system calls in the appli-
cation layer of the communication protocol stack, (ii) association of data payload 
with different fields of application protocols, (iii) connectivity patterns between 
secure servers and the Internet and (iv) the rate and the burst length distributions 
of all traffic types [13]. In addition, profiles based on a network must be adaptive 
and have the ability of self-learning from complex and challenging network traffic 
to preserve the accuracy and in achieving a low false acceptance rate (FAR).
In a large data network, detection of malicious and anomalous traffic is a 
complex task that poses some significant critical challenges. It is difficult to analyze 
and monitor a huge volume of traffic that contains network data with a very high-
dimensional feature space. Such monitoring and analysis of network traffic data 
calls for highly efficient computational algorithms in data processing and pattern 
learning. Moreover, the anomalous traffic in a network exhibits a common behavior. 
In large volume network traffic data, the malicious and anomalous traffic of the 
same type tends to occur repeatedly, while the number of occurrences of malicious 
and anomalous data is much smaller than the number of occurrences of normal 
data. This makes the network traffic data highly imbalanced. It is also difficult, if 
not impossible, to determine accurately a normal region, or define the boundary 
between the normal and the anomalous traffic. To complicate the issue further, 
the concept of anomaly varies among different application domains. In many 
situations, labeled anomalous data are not available for the training and validation 
processes. Training and testing data contain the noise of unknown distributions, 
and the normal and anomalous behavior constantly changes. All these issues make 
anomaly detection in a network a particularly difficult task.
5. Machine learning in anomaly detection
Figure 3 depicts the schematic diagram of a typical anomaly detection system. 
Anomaly detection systems broadly work in the five steps: (i) data collection, (ii) 
data preprocessing, (iii) normal behavior learning phase, (iv) identification of 
misbehaviors using dissimilarity detection techniques and (v) security responses. 
In a large-scale network, the data collection phase involves a large volume of data 
to be collected from the network. In the data preprocessing phase, the volume of 
data is reduced as this step includes feature selection, feature extraction, and finally 
dimensionality reduction processes.
Machine learning algorithms can be very effective in building normal profiles 
and then in designing intrusion detection systems based on anomaly detection 
approach. In the anomaly detection approach, the network traffic data belonging to 
a normal class are usually available for training the model. However, in most of the 
applications, labeled data for anomalous traffic are not available. We have already 
seen that supervised machine learning algorithms need attack-free training data. 
In other words, supervised learning needs labeled network data for both types of 
traffic—normal and attack. However, in most of the real-world situations, such 
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prelabeled training data for both classes are very difficult to get. In most cases, not 
only are the prelabeled training data not available, but also the traffic data in net-
works exhibit highly imbalanced characteristics. A large majority of normal traffic 
record is mixed with a tiny minority of attack traffic records. To make the challenge 
even bigger, with the change in the network environment, patterns of normal traffic 
also exhibit substantial changes. The significant difference in the characteristics 
of training and test datasets most often leads to high false positive rates (FPRs) for 
supervised intrusion detection systems (IDSs). Unsupervised learning methods as 
adopted by anomaly detection systems can potentially get rid of this problem by 
building a normal profile of network traffic and by defining a normal state of the 
system. Any deviation from the normal state indicates the presence of an anomalous 
activity in a network. Hence, semi-supervised and unsupervised machine learning 
methods are frequently deployed in real-world security applications [14].
5.1 Rule-based anomaly detection
In misuse detection, rules depict the strength of correlation between the condi-
tions of the attributes and class labels. In the context of anomaly detection, the rules 
are the descriptors of normal profiles of users, application and system programs, 
and other resources in the computing and network infrastructures. An anomaly 
detection system is expected to raise an alarm of a potential attack if it observes any 
Figure 3. 
Sequence of execution of modules in an anomaly detection system.
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inconsistency among the current activities of the programs and the users with the 
established rules in the system. For an anomaly detection system to work effec-
tively, it is critical to have an exhaustive set of rules working. The use of associative 
classification and association rules in anomaly-based intrusion detection systems is 
quite common. A number of propositions exist in the literature that has exploited 
the power of association rules in designing anomaly detection models [2, 15, 16]. 
Anomaly detection systems using association rules broadly work in two steps. In 
the first step, effective data mining operations are carried out on the system and 
network audit data for identifying consistent and useful patterns of the behaviors 
of the programs and the users. In the second step, robust classifiers are inductively 
learned using the training dataset on the relevant features in the patterns to recog-
nize any anomalous behavior in the system or in the network traffic. The concept 
of frequent episodes is presented in [17]. Lee and Stolfo utilized the concept of 
frequent episodes introduced in [17] to characterize the audit sequences occurring 
in normal data [2]. Based on the frequent episodes in the network, the authors 
designed a small set of rules that could effectively capture the frequent behaviors 
in those sequences. During the monitoring phase of the detection system, the event 
sequences that were found to violate the rules are identified as the anomalous events 
in the cyberinfrastructure.
5.2 Fuzzy rule-based anomaly detection
The anomaly detection systems working on the association rules use a deter-
ministic value or an interval to quantify the rules. In such a scenario, the normal 
and anomalous records are separated by clearly defined and sharp boundaries in 
the n-dimensional feature space, where n is the number of features in the dataset. 
However, such a crisp separation poses a significant challenge in correctly detect-
ing the normal audit records in situations where these normal data deviate from 
the established association rules by a small margin. This problem is handled by 
introducing fuzzy logic in designing the association rules, and thereby incor-
porating flexibility in the operations of rule-based anomaly detection systems. 
Moreover, many of the features may be ordinal or categorical in nature, thereby 
making the design of association rules based on crisp and deterministic values of 
the features a well-neigh impossible proposition. Hence, the introduction of fuzzi-
ness in the association rules becomes mandatory. For example, a rule may contain 
the connection duration of a user’s process by using the following expression, such 
as “connection duration = 3 min” or “1 min ≤ connection duration ≤ 4 min.” Luo 
and Bridges investigated the fuzzy rule-based anomaly detection using real-world 
data and simulated dataset [18]. The real-network traffic data were collected by 
the Department of Computer Science at Mississippi State University by tcpdump 
[19]. Four features were extracted from the data. These features were denoted as: 
SN, FN, RN, and PN. SN, FN, and RN denote, respectively, the number of SYN, 
FIN, and FST flags appearing in the TCP packet headers in the last 2 seconds. 
PN denotes the number of destination ports in the last 2 seconds. Three fuzzy 
sets were designed, which were given names: LOW, MEDIUM, and HIGH. Each 
feature was divided into these three fuzzy sets. Fuzzy association rules were 
derived from the dataset based on the first three features of the data, and fuzzy 
frequency episode rules were designed for the last feature. Network traffic data in 
the afternoon of a given day were used in training of the model and in deriving the 
fuzzy rules in the normal traffic data. The traffic data from the afternoon, eve-
ning, and night on the same day were used for testing and anomaly detection. For 
testing the model, a similarity function was used to compare the normal patterns 
with the anomalous patterns.
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5.3 Artificial neural networks
Artificial neural networks (ANNs) allow for generalization in incomplete data 
and enable the detection of anomalous behavior in anomaly detection systems. 
The standard feed-forward multi-layer perceptron (MLP) with the ability of 
backpropagation of errors is particularly suited for carrying out anomaly detection. 
In the forward propagation phase, the ANN is trained on the training dataset. The 
data are fed into the network through the nodes in the input layer. The nodes at each 
layer are activated and their output passed on to the nodes in the next layer till the 
output values come out of the nodes at the output layer. The output values produced 
by the output layer nodes are then compared with the desired or target values at the 
corresponding nodes. The difference between the actual output value and the target 
output value signifies the error at the node at the output layer. The error values are 
backpropagated through the links in the network from the nodes at the output layer 
back to the nodes at the input layer so that the weights in the links and the biases at 
the nodes can be updated. This process of forward and back propagation continues 
until the error values at the output nodes fall below a threshold value. At this point 
the training process completes. Ghosh et al. [12, 20] and Liu et al. [21] applied 
ANNs in anomaly detection methods in computer networks.
5.4 Support vector machines
Support vector machines (SVMs) outperform ANNs in many situations as they 
have the ability to attain the global optimum state more efficiently and can control 
the model overfitting problem more effectively by fine-tuning the model param-
eters. SVMs can be gainfully deployed in anomaly detection by training them on 
datasets containing attack traffic and normal traffic. This is a supervised way of 
learning for SVMs. However, SVMs can also be applied effectively in an unsuper-
vised way of identifying anomalous traffic in a network. Chen et al. used BSM audit 
data from the 1998 DARPA intrusion detection evaluation datasets and trained an 
SVM-based anomaly detection system using the dataset [22]. Hu et al. presented a 
comparative study on the performance of a robust support vector machine (RSVM) 
and a conventional SVM based on the nearest neighbor classification in separating 
normal traffic from attack traffic generated by various computer programs [23]. 
The results presented by the authors clearly showed that RSVMs had higher detec-
tion accuracy with a much lower value of false positives as compared with their 
conventional SVM counterparts. RSVMs also exhibited higher generalization ability 
in extracting information from noisy data.
5.5 Nearest neighbor-based learning
Nearest neighbor-based machine learning programs assume that the normal 
pattern of an activity displays a close displacement measured by a distance metric, 
while anomaly data points lie far from this neighborhood. K-nearest neighbor 
(KNN) method is a classification approach that uses a voting score among all the 
neighbors of a given data point in determining its class membership. The KNN 
learning-based anomaly detection method is effective only if the value of k is more 
than the frequency of occurrence of any anomalous data in traffic audit dataset, 
and the Euclidean distance between the anomalous data groups from the normal 
data group is large in the n-dimensional feature space of the traffic dataset. In 
the literature, several anomaly detection approaches have been proposed using 
different variants of the basic nearest neighborhood-based classification method. 
These methods use different definitions of the nearest neighbor for the purpose 
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of detection of anomalous traffic. Liao and Vemuri presented a KNN classifier 
model to classify the behavior of computer programs into two types—normal and 
anomalous [24]. In the proposed scheme, the behavior of a program was repre-
sented by the number of system calls made by the program. While every system 
call was treated as a word, the set of all system calls made by a program over its 
entire life span of execution was compiled as a document. The programs were 
subsequently classified into normal or anomalous classes using a KNN classi-
fier constructed using document classification methods on the documents. The 
experiments were performed using the BSM audit data in the 1998 DARPA intru-
sion detection evaluation datasets. In the training phase, 3556 normal programs 
and 49 distinct system calls in 1 simulation day were used. The test audit data were 
scanned for programs to measure the distance. The distances were then sorted in 
the increasing order of their magnitudes and the top k scores were selected for the 
k nearest neighbors for each of the records in the test audit data. For the purpose 
of anomaly detection, a threshold value of the average of the top k distances for 
each record in the test dataset was determined. In their experiments, authors tried 
out different values of the threshold distance and the k values so as to determine 
the most optimal performance of the KNN classifier as depicted by its receiver 
operating characteristics (ROC) curve. The KNN algorithms were found to detect 
100% of the attacks while keeping a false positive rate (FPR) at a very low value of 
0.082% with k = 5 and a threshold value of 0.74.
5.6 Hidden Markov model and Kalman filter
Hidden Markov model (HMM) considers transition properties of events. In 
network security applications it can be effectively deployed for detecting anoma-
lous activities and events. In anomaly detection, HMMs can very accurately model 
the temporal variations in program behavior [25–27]. Before the deployment of an 
HMM in anomaly detection, the definition of a normal sate of activity S and a data-
set of normal observable events O are to be decided upon. Starting from the initial 
state of S, and given a sequence of observations Y, the HMM searches for a sequence 
X that contains all normal states, and that has a predicted observation sequence that 
is most similar to Y with a computed probability value. If this computed probability 
value is smaller than a predefined threshold value, the sequence Y is assumed to 
have led the system to an anomalous state. Warrender et al. proposed an HMM-
based anomaly detection model using publicly available datasets on systems calls 
from nine programs [25]. The datasets used were MIT LPR and UNM LPR [25]. 
An HMM with 40 states was designed. These 40 states represented 40 system calls 
that were present in all those nine programs. The HMM was designed in a fully 
connected manner so that transitions were possible from any given state to any 
other state in the model. The Baum-Welch algorithm was applied to fine-tune the 
parameters of the HMM using the training dataset [28]. The Baum-Welch algorithm 
works on the principles of dynamic programming and it is a variant of expecta-
tion maximization (EM) algorithm. The Viterbi algorithm was utilized to find out 
which choice of states maximizes the joint probability distribution given the trained 
parameter matrices of the HMM [29]. In other words, the Viterbi algorithm identi-
fies the most likely state, given a dataset and a trained HMM model. The authors 
contend that for a well-designed HMM, a sequence of system calls that represents 
normal activities will lead to state transitions and output values that are highly 
likely; on the other hand, a sequence of system calls that represents an anomalous 
activity will lead to state transitions and output values that are unusual. Hence, in 
order to detect anomalous events in a network, it is sufficient to track unusual state 
transitions and abnormal output values. The experimental results indicated that the 
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HMM could detect anomalous traffic efficiently and effectively with a low value of 
mismatch rate. In general, training of an HMM is a very time-consuming process as 
it requires multiple epochs (i.e., passes) through the records in a training dataset. 
Since all the transition probabilities corresponding to long sequences of state transi-
tions are needed to be stored, training an HMM is a memory-intensive operation 
as well. Soule et al. presented an anomaly detection method in a large-scale data 
network [30]. The detection scheme analyzed the traffic patterns in a network, and 
computed the state the network using a Kalman filter. A Kalman filter is a set of 
mathematical equations that implements a predictor-corrector type estimation that 
is optimal [31]. The optimality here refers minimization of error covariance. The 
Kalman filter used in the anomaly detection filtered out the normal traffic state by 
comparing the predictions made by the current traffic state to an inference of the 
actual traffic state. The residual process is then analyzed for possible anomalies.
5.7 Clustering-based anomaly detection
Supervised learning methods for the detection of anomalous activities in a net-
work require prior labeling of the traffic types. However, it is very difficult to have 
prior labeling of audit data in real-world network environments. Signature-based 
detection suffers from this problem as carrying out a manual classification in a huge 
volume of network traffic to identify a small number of attack traffic records poses 
a significant challenge. Unsupervised learning-based anomaly detection methods 
do suffer from this drawback as these methods can work on unlabeled network 
traffic data. These methods attempt to detect malicious traffic in a network even 
without any prior knowledge about the traffic data labels. Unsupervised learning-
based anomaly detection methods work under the following premise: in a network, 
characteristics of traffic are highly imbalanced—normal traffic constitutes a vast 
majority, while anomalous traffic represents a tiny minority. Moreover, attack 
traffic and the normal traffic exhibit similar statistical distributions in their respec-
tive group, while the distributions of the two groups are different from each other. 
Learning from an imbalanced data so that the anomalous and normal traffic can be 
categorized into two different clusters is the prime focus in unsupervised anomaly 
detection methods. Hence, cluster-based anomaly and outlier detection is the most 
fundamental approach in an unsupervised intrusion detection method. Portnoy 
et al. proposed a clustering-based anomaly detection method using DARPA knowl-
edge discovery in databases (KDD) Cup 1999 dataset [32]. DARPA KDD Cup 1999 
dataset consisted of a network traffic record of 4,900,000 data points. The dataset 
contained 25 different types of traffic—24 attack types and 1 normal traffic. Each 
data point represented a set of extracted feature values from a connection record 
obtained between different IP addresses of hosts during a period of time in which 
attacks were simulated in a network. The authors observed that clustering with 
unlabeled data resulted in a lower detection rate of attacks than attack classification 
using a supervised learning method. However, unsupervised detection methods on 
unlabeled data can potentially detect unknown attacks through an automated or 
semi-automated process that cannot be done using supervised detection methods.
5.8 Random forests
Random forests are powerful machine learning models based on ensemble 
approach. They build multiple decision trees by randomly choosing a subset of 
features and then combine those decision tree results to arrive at a much more robust 
prediction. Due to their higher accuracy of prediction, random forests have been 
deployed in a variety of applications including multimedia information retrieval, 
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network security and intrusion detection systems design. The algorithms used in 
random forests usually yield higher accuracy, and they work very efficiently on large 
datasets with high-dimensional feature space. Traffic in a large network is an exam-
ple of a large volume of high-dimensional data, and such data can be very effectively 
classified in real-time by random forest-based classification approach. The use of 
random forest algorithms for detecting outliers in datasets containing network traffic 
without attack-free training data has been proposed in the literature [33, 34].
5.9 Other machine learning methods in anomaly detection
Other machine learning methods have been proposed for learning the prob-
ability distribution of data and in applying statistical tests to detect outliers. Eskin 
proposed a mixture probability model on normal and anomalous data based on 
expectation maximization (EM) algorithms [35]. Other statistical machine learning 
methods have been investigated in anomaly detection applications, such as mean 
and variance [4, 30], Hotelling’s T2 test and the Chi-square test [36, 37], Hellinger 
score [38], histogram density [39], Bayesian law [40], cumulative summation 
(CUMSUM) and statistical test [30]. Ye et al. used a series of probability techniques 
of anomaly detection, including decision tree, Hotelling’s T2 test, Chi-square mul-
tivariate test, and Markov chain in an information system for detecting intrusions 
[41]. Network-wide anomaly detection using principal component analysis (PCA) 
has been proved very effective [42–44]. Several studies have also found that a wide 
range of anomalies in networks can be detected by computing the entropy in the 
network flow and feature distributions [37, 42, 45]. Table 2 presents a summary of 
the anomaly-based detection schemes.
6. Machine learning in hybrid detection
Since misuse detection systems work on matching already known attack signa-
tures with the current events in a network, they usually have high detection rates 
Detection mechanism Input data format Detection 
level
References
Statistical methods Frequency of system calls, offline Host [36, 37]
Statistical methods TCP/IP packets, online Network [30, 38, 40]
Clustering algorithms Frequency of system calls, online Network [25, 32, 33]
Information theoretic TCP/IP packets, offline Network [37, 42, 45]
Association rules TCP/IP packets, offline Host [2, 15–17]
Fuzzy association rules [18]
Kalman filter TCP/IP packets, online Network [30]
Hidden Markov model Frequency of system calls, offline Host [25–27]
Artificial neural network Executables, offline Host [12, 20, 21]
Principal component analysis Frequency of system calls, offline Network [42–44]
Support vector machine TCP/IP packets, offline Network [22, 23]
K-nearest neighbors Frequency of system calls, offline Host [24]
Random forests TCP/IP packets, offline Network [33, 34]
Table 2. 
Anomaly-based detection schemes.
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Figure 4. 
Three categories of hybrid detection systems. (a) Anomaly-misuse sequence, (b) misuse-anomaly sequence,  
(c) parallel detection system (adapted from [43]).
and low false alarm rates. However, these systems cannot detect novel attacks. On 
the other hand, anomaly detection systems define normal sates in a network and 
then detect system states that significantly differ from the normal states. Any state 
that significantly differs from the normal state of the network indicates the possible 
event of an attack. The anomaly detection system can detect new attacks launched 
on a network. There is a challenge in the anomaly detection system design. If the 
normal state patterns do not significantly differ from patterns exhibited by any 
anomalous state, the attack state will go undetected. This leads to an increase in the 
false alarm rate. Hence, it is critical to design a normal state in such a way that while 
the detection rate is maximized, the number of false alarms does not exceed beyond 
an acceptable limit. If the normal state is too wide, then the detection rate will suf-
fer. On the other hand, too narrow a normal state will lead to a high false alarm rate. 
The hybrid detection approach combines the adaptability and the powerful detec-
tion ability of an anomaly detection system with the higher accuracy and reliability 
of the misuse detection approach.
Designing an efficient and accurate hybrid detection system involves two critical 
issues: (i) the most ideal misuse or anomaly detection systems are to be first identi-
fied that can be integrated with anomaly detection systems, so that hybrid detection 
is possible and (ii) the two systems are to be integrated in the most optimal way so 
that the balance between the detection rate and false alarm rate is achieved while 
retaining the ability of detecting novel attacks.
The selection of misuse and anomaly detection systems for designing a hybrid 
detection system is dependent on the application in which the detection system is 
to be deployed. Following a combinational approach, the integration of an anomaly 
detection system with a misuse detection counterpart has been classified into four 
categories [46, 47]. These types are: (i) anomaly-misuse sequence detection, (ii) 
misuse-anomaly sequence detection, (iii) parallel detection and (iv) complex mix-
ture detection (Figure 4). The complex mixture model is highly application-specific.
Barbara et al. presented a hybrid detection system on the principle of the 
anomaly-misuse sequence [48]. The proposed system, which is known as audit data 
analysis and mining (ADAM), minimizes false alarm rates by not raising any alarm 
for those patterns that are not classified attacks by the misuse detection system. 
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Misuse-anomaly sequence detection systems primarily focus on detecting novel 
attacks that are missed by the misuse detection module. The machine learning 
algorithms used by these hybrid detection models are mainly based on different 
variants of random forests [47, 49]. Anderson et al. proposed the design of a parallel 
intrusion detection system that provided a very accurate and robust detection deci-
sion by correlating the outputs of the misuse detection and the anomaly detection 
modules [50]. Agrawal et al. proposed an illustrative complex intrusion detection 
system [51]. The system worked on the AdaBoost algorithm of classification and 
both the misuse and the anomaly detection systems are trained on the training 
data simultaneously. The detection results on the test data are also presented 
separately for the misuse detection module and the anomaly detection module. 
Sen et al. proposed various architecture of complex detection systems based on 
cooperating agents [52–54]. The audit trails in the basic security module (BSM) of 
a Solaris system were exploited by Endler in designing a hybrid detection system 
[55]. An ANN-based hybrid detection system for detecting both signature-based 
and anomaly-based attacks is proposed by Ghosh and Schwartzbard [12]. Lee et al. 
presented a data mining-based hybrid intrusion detection system for identifying 
attack traffic from the audit data in a host [2]. Table 3 presents a summary of the 
hybrid detection systems discussed in this section.
7. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have discussed various approaches to misuse and anomaly 
detection systems design using machine learning and data mining techniques. Some 
of the well-known systems in the literature have also been reviewed briefly. We have 
also discussed the pros and cons of various systems in context to their applications 
and deployment in real-world networks.
A fundamental challenge in designing an intrusion detection system is the limited 
availability of appropriate data for model building and testing. Generating data for 
intrusion detection is an extremely painstaking and complex task that mandates 
the generation of normal system data as well as anomalous and attack data. If a 
real-world network environment, generating normal traffic data is not a problem. 
However, the data may too privacy-sensitive to be made available for public research.
Classification-based methods require training data to be well balanced with 
normal traffic data and attack traffic data. Although it is desirable to have a good 
mix of a large variety of attack traffic data (including some novel attacks), it may 
Detection mechanism Input data format Detection 
level
References
Random forests TCP/IP packets, online Network [46, 47, 49]
Association rules TCP/IP packets, online Network [48]
Association rules Frequency of system calls, online Host [2]
Cooperating agents TCP/IP packets, online Network [52–56]
Correlation TCP/IP packets, online Network [50]
Clustering TCP/IP packets, offline Network [51]
Statistical analysis and ANN Sequences of system calls, offline Host [55]
ANN TCP/IP packets, online Network [12]
Table 3. 
Hybrid intrusion schemes based on machine learning.
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not be feasible in practice. Moreover, the labeling of data is mandatory with attack 
and normal traffic data clearly distinguished by their respective labels.
Unlike classification-based approaches, which are mostly used in misuse detection, 
unsupervised anomaly detection-based approaches do not require any prior labeling 
of the training data. In most of the cases, the attack traffic constitutes the sparse class, 
and hence, the smaller clusters are most likely to correspond to the attack traffic data. 
Although unsupervised anomaly detection is a very interesting approach, the results 
produced by this method are unacceptably low in terms of their detection accuracies.
In a pure anomaly detection approach, the training data are assumed to be con-
sisting of only normal traffic. By training the detection model only on the normal 
traffic data, the detection accuracy of the system can be significantly improved. 
Anomalous states are indicated by only a significant state change from the normal 
sate of the system.
In a real-world network that is connected to the Internet, an assumption of 
attack-free traffic is utopian. A pure anomaly detection system can still be trained 
on training data that include attack traffic. In that case, those attack traffic data will 
be considered as normal traffic and the detection system will not raise an alert when 
such traffic is encountered in real-world operations. Hence, in order to increase the 
detection accuracy, attack traffic should be removed from the training data as much 
as possible. The removal of attack traffic from the training data can be done using 
updated misuse detection systems or by deploying multiple anomaly detection 
systems and combining their results by a voting mechanism.
For an intrusion detection system that is deployed in a real-world network, it 
is mandatory to have a real-time detection capability under a high-speed, high-
volume data environment. However, most of the cluster techniques used in unsu-
pervised detection require quadratic time. This renders their deployment infeasible 
in practical applications. Moreover, the cluster algorithms are not scalable, and they 
need the entire training data to reside in the memory during the training process. 
This requirement puts a restriction on the model size. The future direction of 
research may include studies on the scalability and performance of anomaly detec-
tion algorithms in conjunction with the detection rate and false positive rate. Most 
of the currently existing propositions on intrusion detection have not paid adequate 
attention to these critical issues.
© 2020 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
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